When Are the Rolls Open Again for the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians

April 03, 2022 Post a Comment

146 F.3d 367

SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS; Grand Traverse
Ring of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians; Keweenaw Bay
Indian Community; Hannahville Indian
Community; Bay Mills Indian
Community, Plaintiffs,
Lac Vieux Desert Ring Of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan, Intervenor,
v.
John M. ENGLER, Governor, Defendant-Appellee,
State of Michigan, Defendant.

No. 97-1648.

U.s. Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.

Argued Apr 21, 1998.
Decided June 5, 1998.

Daniel T. Green, Sault Ste. Marie, MI, for Plaintiff Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians.

William Rastetter, Cedar, MI, for Plaintiff Grand Traverse Ring of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians.

Joseph P. O'Leary, Baraga, MI, for Plaintiff Keweenaw Bay Indian Community.

Dawn Due south. Duncan, Wilson, MI, for Plaintiff Hannahville Indian Community.

Anthony Due east. Andary, Andary & Andary, Sault Ste. Marie, MI, for Plaintiff Bay Mills Indian Customs.

Conly J. Schulte (argued and briefed), John Yard. Peebles (briefed), Monteau, Peebles & Evans, Omaha, NE, for Plaintiff-Appellant Lac Vieux Desert Ring of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians.

Michael M. Phelan, Mt. Pleasant, MI, for Intervenor Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan.

Keith D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney Full general of Michigan (argued and briefed), Lansing, MI, for Defendant State of Michigan.

Keith D. Roberts, Banana Attorney General, Frank J. Kelley, Office of Attorney General, Appellate Sectionalization, Lansing, MI, for Defendant-Appellee John M. Engler, Governor.

Before: MARTIN, Primary Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and SILER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Principal Gauge.

Advertizement

The stakes are oftentimes high in gambling, and millions of dollars are riding on the estimation of a consent judgment in this Indian gaming instance. At issue is whether several Michigan Indian tribes are obligated to proceed making payments to the State of Michigan under the terms of a consent judgment entered several years ago. Co-ordinate to the consent judgment, the obligation to make payments is contingent upon the Tribes holding the "exclusive right to operate" electronic games of hazard in Michigan. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, No. 1:ninety-CV-611 (Due west.D.Mich. Aug. 20, 1993). The district court determined that the Tribes all the same concord the exclusive right to operate electronic games of chance, and in reaching that determination it excluded extrinsic evidence regarding the estimation of the consent judgment. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, No. 1:xc-CV-611 (W.D.Mich. March 17, 1997). We concur with the district courtroom'south interpretation of the consent judgment and with its decision to exclude extrinsic evidence. Nosotros also concur that the commune court ruled correctly in denying the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians' motion to alter or better the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(eastward). Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians five. Engler, No. 1:xc-CV-611 (Due west.D.Mich. May 20, 1997). We therefore affirm the district court's decisions.

This case grew out of a dispute between several Indian tribes and the State of Michigan over the issuance of gaming permits. The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, G Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, Hannahville Indian Community, Bay Mills Indian Community, and Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians filed suit against the Country of Michigan in the United States District Courtroom for the Western District of Michigan on July 10, 1990. The Tribes, which are all federally acknowledged Indian tribes, alleged that the State was not negotiating in proficient faith to conclude a Tribal/Country gaming contract under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721. On March 26, 1992, the district court dismissed the example after determining that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against the State. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F.Supp. 1484 (W.D.Mich.1992). The 6th Circuit found that information technology did not have jurisdiction over the entreatment. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, five F.3d 147 (sixth Cir.1993). While the entreatment was awaiting, the Tribes filed an amended complaint on May 5, 1992, naming Michigan Governor John Engler, rather than the State of Michigan, as defendant.

The parties stipulated for the entry of a consent judgment, and the commune courtroom entered the judgment on August 20, 1993. Nether the consent judgment, the Land and the Tribes were directed to enter a gaming compact nether which the Tribes would operate electronic games of chance. The consent judgment called for the Tribes to make semi-annual payments to the Michigan Strategic Fund of eight pct of the cyberspace win at each casino from electronic games of chance. The Tribes were obligated to continue making the payments "simply so long every bit the tribes collectively enjoy the sectional correct to operate electronic games of chance in Michigan...." The Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan was likewise added as a party for the purpose of the consent judgment. The courtroom dismissed the case with prejudice only retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent judgment. The parties operated under the terms of the judgment for virtually three years.

In the November 5, 1996, general ballot, the people of Michigan voted on and adopted "Proposal Eastward," the Michigan Gaming Command and Revenue Human action. (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 432.201-432.216 (West Supp.1998)). The Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Human activity became effective on December five and was amended by Southward.B. No. 569, 89th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich.1997) (codified equally amended at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 432.201-432.226 (West Supp.1998)). The Act established the Michigan Gaming Command Board and authorized the Board to grant up to iii licenses for casino gaming in Detroit. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 432.204, § 432.206 (West Supp.1998). Under the current constabulary, before the applicant can apply to the Michigan Gaming Control Board, Detroit must pass an ordinance regulating gaming, the bidder must establish a development agreement with the urban center, and the bidder must have a programme for customs investment or involvement. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 432.206(one) (West Supp.1998). When these criteria, among others, are met, the application is forwarded to the Michigan Gaming Control Board. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 432.206(1) (Due west Supp.1998). Under Michigan law, a casino is "a building in which gaming is conducted," and gaming is defined as operating "whatsoever gambling game or gambling operation." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 432.202(thou), (10) (West Supp.1998). Therefore, a casino license necessarily includes the right to operate electronic games of risk.

In response to the passage of "Proposal East," several of the Tribes notified the State that they would no longer make their semi-annual payments because their exclusive rights to operate casino games had been terminated. On December 9, 1996, Governor Engler filed a motion to compel compliance with the consent judgment. On March fourteen, 1997, the commune court issued an opinion and guild granting in part and denying in part Governor Engler's motion to compel compliance with the consent judgment. On March 28, the Lac Vieux filed a motion under Rule 59(due east) to alter or ameliorate judgment. On May twenty, the court denied the Lac Vieux's Rule 59(e) motility. The Lac Vieux filed a timely movement of entreatment of the March 17 and May twenty orders on June 13. The Lac Vieux tribe is the only tribe involved in the appeal.i

II.

A. Meaning of "Sectional Right to Operate"

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At issue in this instance is the interpretation of the consent judgment. A district court'due south estimation of a consent decree or judgment is a matter of law subject to de novo review, and the underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 67 F.3d 129, 132 (6th Cir.1995). Where as here, though, we are reviewing the interpretation of a consent judgment by the commune court that crafted the consent judgment, it is probably more accurate to describe our standard of review as "deferential de novo." It is but sensible to give the court that wrote the consent judgment greater deference when it is parsing its ain piece of work. Equally this Court has noted: "[a]t first blush, giving substantial deference to the district court's estimation of the [consent] decree appears to exist inconsistent with de novo review. Yet, in Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.second 551, 558 northward. 12 (6th Cir.1981), we explained that the commune courtroom'south reading of the decree was merely an additional tool for contract estimation." Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 52 F.3d 1364, 1369-lxx (6th Cir.1995). As the Courtroom noted in Brown, "[f]ew persons are in a improve position to sympathize the meaning of a consent decree than the district approximate who oversaw and approved it." 644 F.2nd at 558 n. 12. We agree, and nosotros will review the commune court'southward decision accordingly.

Consent decrees and judgments are binding contracts. Come across id. at 557. The interpretation of a consent prescript or judgment is a question of contractual interpretation. Huguley, 67 F.3d at 132. Because this contract was formed in the State of Michigan, it is interpreted under Michigan law. Sawyer v. Arum, 690 F.2d 590, 593 (6th Cir.1982). Nether Michigan police force, "[t]he primary goal in the construction or interpretation of any contract is to honor the intent of the parties." Rasheed five. Chrysler Corp., 445 Mich. 109, 517 N.W.second xix, 29 due north. 28 (1994). The Court "must expect for the intent of the parties in the words used in the musical instrument." Michigan Chandelier Co. v. Morse, 297 Mich. 41, 297 N.W. 64, 67 (1941).

This dispute centers on the words "exclusive right to operate," and fifty-fifty more directly on the words "exclusive correct." What is an exclusive correct? The Lac Vieux contend that when "Proposal E" was signed into police force the Tribes lost their exclusive right and therefore no longer needed to brand payments to the Land. The district court held that "the Tribes lose their 'exclusive right to operate' when the [Michigan Gaming Control Board] issues a license to operate a casino to a person or entity other than the Tribes." Although the State originally contended that the Tribes' obligation to make payments lasted until some other casino operator actually began to operate a casino, it at present agrees with the district court'due south middle position that the obligation lasts until another operator receives a license.

The Lac Vieux raise several points of contention with the commune court stance. They contend that, "[s]ince Proposal E became constructive ... the operation of electronic games of chance is no longer prohibited in the Country of Michigan." They hang this statement on a definition of "prohibited" extracted from the Supreme Court opinion in California v. Cabazon Ring of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). In Cabazon, the Court distinguished between "criminal/prohibitory" laws and "ceremonious/regulatory" laws in determining that federal law did non permit California to regulate tribal bingo enterprises. Id. at 209-xi, 107 Due south.Ct. 1083. The Lac Vieux fence that Cabazon 'south definition of "prohibit" is relevant because the district court in this case determined that the Tribes accept an exclusive right "equally long every bit others are prohibited or close out from the 'right to operate' such games" and that, following the passage of "Proposal Eastward," electronic games of chance are regulated but not prohibited in Michigan.

The Lac Vieux's argument has multiple flaws. First, the Cabazoncase centers on statutory interpretation and deals with the enforceability of state laws on Indian reservation land. This case does not deal with statutory estimation and has cypher to do with the enforceability of state laws. The Lac Vieux do not fence that Michigan never had the ability to collect the payments from the Tribes; the Lac Vieux merely contend that the State no longer has that ability. Therefore, the Cabazon definition of "prohibit" is not necessarily relevant to the estimation of a consent judgment.

Even if the restricted definition of "prohibit" were germane, the Lac Vieux ignore the fact that the commune court posits its qualification for exclusivity in the disjunctive. Exclusivity depends on others existence "prohibited or shut out." Even if we were to accept the Lac Vieux'south definition of "prohibit," the Lac Vieux would non prevail because other operators are nonetheless "shut out" from operating electronic games of run a risk. Operation of electronic games of chance without a license is confronting the police force in the State of Michigan. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.303 (Westward 1991 & Supp.1998).

The district court defined "exclusive" as "limited to possession, command or use by a single private or group." The Lac Vieux contend that the court misapplied its own definition because the court considered but "possession" and "utilise" and ignored the term "control." The commune court did not determine whether the Tribes controlled casino gambling in Michigan because, once over again, the district court definition is in the disjunctive. It is "possession, command or employ," and there is, therefore, no need to show all three elements to prove exclusivity. As Governor Engler points out, it makes no sense to read the consent decree every bit workout the Tribes' payments on their control of casino gambling considering they never controlled it. If the Tribes controlled casino gambling, they would never surrender their exclusivity or pay money to the Country--making much of the consent judgment surplusage. To the extent any entity controls casino gambling it is the state legislature.

xiv

At this fourth dimension, no 1 but the Tribes has the right to operate electronic games of chance. The Tribes can point to no one who is infringing their right. They will go along to accept an exclusive right until the Michigan Gaming Control Lath grants casino licenses to non-Tribal groups. The district court was correct in holding that the Tribes maintain their exclusive right until another grouping receives a casino license.

B. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence

In finding the plain meaning of "exclusive right to operate," the district court also determined that it did not demand to consider extrinsic evidence. The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous, thereby making extrinsic evidence admissible for interpretive purposes, is a question of constabulary and therefore subject to de novo review. Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1376 (6th Cir.1994). A courtroom "does non have the correct to brand a different contract for the parties or to look to extrinsic testimony to determine their intent when the words used by them are clear and unambiguous and have a definite meaning." Michigan Chandelier, 297 N.W. at 67. "A contract is ambiguous if 'its words may reasonably be understood in different ways.' " UAW-GM Human Resource Ctr. 5. KSL Recreation Corp., 228 Mich.App. 486, 579 Due north.W.2d 411 (1998) (quoting Raska 5. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 412 Mich. 355, 314 N.W.2d 440 (1982)). The Lac Vieux argue that if the district court did not adopt their interpretation of the phrase "sectional right to operate," and so the phrase must be ambiguous. The Lac Vieux contend that the variance between their definition and the district court's definition creates sufficient ambiguity to merit the admission of extrinsic evidence. Only claiming the contract is ambiguous does not, however, make information technology so. The district court was correct in determining that the terms of the consent judgment were unambiguous.

sixteen

Even if the district courtroom had found the terms of the contract cryptic, it is not clear how the admission of the Lac Vieux'south extrinsic evidence would accept aided the procedure of contract interpretation. Among the extrinsic evidence the Lac Vieux propose to offering are an affidavit and testimony from an accountant, an excerpt from a brief filed by Governor Engler in a country lawsuit, and affidavits from two bankers. The accountant testified nearly the economical damage the Tribes would suffer from "Proposal E." The Lac Vieux debate that the excerpt from the Engler cursory shows that Governor Engler regarded the Tribes' obligation to pay every bit terminated merely with the passage of legislation allowing gambling. The bankers testified to the difficulty the Tribes would feel in getting loans in lite of "Proposal E." None of the evidence relates to the formation of the contract. For extrinsic evidence to be relevant, information technology must relate to the formation of the contract. Come across, e.thousand., Sawyer, 690 F.2d at 593 (noting that nether Michigan law extrinsic evidence may be admitted in absenteeism of facial ambiguity in lodge to examine circumstances surrounding formation of contract); Gary Boat Club, Inc. v. Oselka, 31 Mich.App. 465, 188 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (1971) (stating that with cryptic contract "trial courtroom should consider the linguistic communication employed, the subject area matter, and the surrounding circumstances under which the parties entered into the agreement; information technology should effectuate the intent of the parties when the agreement was consummated"); Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co. 5. Sefa, 23 Mich.App. 423, 178 Northward.West.2d 826, 828-29 (1970) ("In determining the intent of the parties where the agreed linguistic communication proves cryptic, surrounding facts and circumstances may be considered for the purpose of interpretation, and statements of the parties contemporaneous with the making of the understanding are admissible every bit evidence."). Post-hoc interpretations of this nature are irrelevant to the parties' intent at the time of the understanding.

C. Motion to Change or Amend Judgment Under Dominion 59(eastward)

The Lac Vieux put forward several arguments in their movement to alter or amend. The district court denied the motility, determining that the arguments were either previously rejected or untimely raised. A deprival of a motion to alter or better a judgment under Rule 59(e) is typically reviewed for corruption of discretion. Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. United States, 136 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.1998). On entreatment, the Lac Vieux are forwarding i argument--that "the District Courtroom erred ... by failing to recognize that Proposal E transferred control over the exclusive right to operate electronic games of chance from the Tribes to the [Michigan Gaming Control Board] and the City of Detroit." Putting aside the consequence of the correctness of the argument, the Lac Vieux raised it belatedly. The Lac Vieux admit that they did not make the statement prior to filing their Dominion 59(due east) motion, but they argue that they did not raise the event because they never thought the district courtroom would determine otherwise. A motility under Rule 59(east) is not an opportunity to re-argue a case. FDIC 5. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d ten, 16 (1st Cir.1992) ("Rule 59(eastward) motions are aimed at re consideration, not initial consideration. Thus, parties should not utilize them to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made earlier judgment issued. Motions nether Rule 59(east) must either conspicuously found a manifest fault of law or must present newly discovered testify." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)). The Lac Vieux did neither in their Dominion 59(e) motion. Considering the Lac Vieux could take, merely did not, enhance their argument earlier the district court ruled on the motion to compel compliance, the argument is barred.

III.

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The district court'south decisions are affirmed.

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Source: https://openjurist.org/146/f3d/367/sault-ste-marie-tribe-of-chippewa-indians-v-m-engler